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ISSN (Print): 1872-2121
ISSN (Online): 2212-4047

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Review Article

An Explainatory Study on Cooperative Investment Risk of Joint Venture Companies from an Economics of Organization Perspective

Author(s): Hao Dai, Chaoqi Zhang* and Xiaojing Yang

Volume 15, Issue 1, 2021

Published on: 17 January, 2020

Page: [77 - 83] Pages: 7

DOI: 10.2174/1872212114666200117101531

Price: $65

Abstract

Background: Joint investment has increasingly become a popular investment method for venture capitalists. From the two traditional perspectives of investors and start-ups, research on Joint Venture Capital in the past 40 years has achieved rich results. Most recent literature is based on research from the perspective of organisational economics, which further advances the vertical development of research on Joint Venture Capital.

Objective: The objective of this paper is to review research topics and core literature on Joint Venture Capital from the perspective of organisational economics, and through introducing the model of venture capitalists' ‘bounded rationality’ and evolutionary game in the joint investment risk analysis. This paper distinguishes the influence of the game model on the formation of joint investment. Finally, it reaches a conclusion and suggests a direction for future research.

Methods: This paper finds and reviews literature on joint venture capital and dynamic game model of joint investment risk that is collated to reduce the actual risk assumed by each investor. Additionally, the paper summarises research topics and progress from the perspective of organisational economics to identify possible research directions for the future.

Results: Based on the evolutionary game method for analysis of the model of joint investment, the following conclusion is drawn: the greater the heterogeneity of the participating entities, the smaller the unit conflict cost benefit and the greater the probability of successful joint venture investment. The joint investment operation mechanism will also be maintained on a long-term and stable manner.

Conclusion: From the perspective of organisational economics, the latest research on Joint Venture Capital has extensively absorbed new research results of relevant disciplines. Joint Venture Capital activities can be understood from a broader perspective and with new insights, which reflect complex and dynamic interaction and correlative dependence on network members. To establish a more successful joint investment model, the paper introduces a relatively novel evolutionary game method for analysis of the joint investment model.

Keywords: Joint venture capital, organizational economics, non-conservative risk, joint investment, inter-organizational learning, relationship governance mechanism.

Graphical Abstract

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